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FLAGGING  INTEREST 
Ship Registration, Owner Anonymity, 
and Sub-standard Shipping 
 
Michael Galley 
 
 
Introduction 
 
An unregistered ship, not flying the flag of any state, is a stateless 
entity, with no legal rights on the high seas. An owner may register a vessel 
in almost any state of his choosing, depending on his objectives and 
motivation; the choice of options is wide and each register may offer its own 
legal and commercial benefits. This paper examines the various types of 
shipping registers, the inducements that many offer, particularly in the way 
of owner anonymity and lack of regulatory interest, and the way in which 
this can lead to the prevalence of sub-standard shipping. From the outset 
however, it needs to be recognised that whilst a number of open registers 
may be worthy of the tag Flag of Convenience ± and even use the term itself 
- this is by no means true of all open registers. 
 
Shipping Registers 
 
6KLSSLQJUHJLVWHUVDUHWUDGLWLRQDOO\GLYLGHGLQWRWKH³FORVHG´UHJLVWHUV
RI WKH PRUH WUDGLWLRQDO PDULWLPH QDWLRQV DQG ³RSHQ´ UHJLVWHUV RI 6WDWHV
which may have a more relaxed regime of financial and regulatory controls 
and often with their minimal requirements of owner nationality. What might 
EH WHUPHG WKH LQWHUPHGLDWH UHJLVWHUV WKH ³VHFRQG´ RU ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO´
registers, lie  somewhere  between the other two categories. Registering a 
YHVVHO LQYROYHVHQWHULQJ WKHGHWDLOV LQWRD6WDWH¶VSXEOLFUHFRUGV1 and is a 
crucial element of public international law. It confers nationality on a ship 
and establishes the jurisdiction of that State over the ship, which is the power 
                                                          
1
 $FFRUGLQJWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHJXODWLRQVRPHVKLSVPD\EHH[FOXGHGIURPDQDWLRQ¶VUHJLVWHURQDFFRXQWRIWKHLU
small size. Ref. Middleton  J., 2007.  Admiralty Education 2007. Ship registration and the role of the flag. 
Federal Court of Australia  at: www.fedcourt.gov.au/how/admiralty_papersandpublications20.rtf  accessed: 
23.3.2011. 
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to prescribe rules of conduct and threaten and enforce sanctions on the 
shipowners.2 It also entitles the ship to fly the flag of the State, which 
thereby becomes the Flag State, as a symbol of its nationality and 
registration.3 7KH WHUP ³IODJ´ LV RIWHQXVHG DV D VKRUWKDQG WHUP IRU )ODJ
6WDWH(QWU\WRDVWDWH¶VUHJLVWHULQWXUQSODFHVDUHVSRQVLELOLW\RQWKH6WDWH
to ensure that the condition of the vessel, its manning, and its operation are 
in compliance with thH6WDWH¶VRZQQDWLRQDOODZVDQGVWDQGDUGVDVZHOODV
with any international treaties to which it is a party. Other public law 
consequences may give access to cargoes, or coastal trading among others 
and the right to diplomatic and naval protection.4 In addition to transfers of 
registration for normal commercial reasons or transfer of ownership, owners 
may change registration to those of major naval powers in times of conflict 
in order to enjoy the protection that such States may offer. Ship registrations 
may also be changed if ships of a specific State are considered unwelcome 
in the ports of other nations.  
A ship that has no entitlement to fly a flag of registration has neither 
nationality nor the right to protection under international law; this principle 
was tested in Naim-Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine5 when an 
unregistered ship flying the flag of Turkey was arrested by a British warship 
on the high seas off the Palestinian coast in 1948 whilst trying to land Jewish 
settlers, and was forfeit by a Palestinian court. The US Court of Appeals 
stated the situation somewhat more abruptly in US v. Marino-Garcia 1982, 
whereby ³YHVVHOV ZLWKRXW QDWLRQDOLW\ DUH LQWHUQDWLRQDO SDULDKV )ODJOHVV
YHVVHOVUHSUHVHQW µIORDWLQJ VDQFWXDULHV IURP DXWKRULW\¶ DQG Fonstitute a 
SRWHQWLDOWKUHDWWRWKHRUGHUDQGVWDELOLW\RIQDYLJDWLRQRQWKHKLJKVHDV´6 
Recognition of the flag was basically codified under Articles 4 and 5 of the 
1958 High Seas Convention (HSC), which grants  the right to all States to 
sail ships under their flags on the high seas, whilst giving each State the 
                                                          
2
 Hosanee N.M., 2009. A critical analysis of flag state duties as laid down under article 94 of the 1982 United 
Nations convention on the law of the sea. Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal 
Affairs, the United Nations, New York. 
3
 Farthing B., M. Brownrigg. 1997. Farthing on international shipping. 3rd. ed. London, LLP Ltd. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Naim-Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine [1948] A.C.351. An appeal against the arrest and seizure of the 
ship was made on the grounds that the freedom of the high seas also applied to ships of no nationality. This appeal 
ZDVUHMHFWHGE\WKH3ULY\&RXQFLOZKRXSKHOGWKHFRXUW¶VIRUIHLWXUHRIWKHYHVVHO 
6
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right to determine the conditions under which that may take place. The 
recognition was subsequently incorporated into the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Articles 90 and 91.  
Closed or national registers have often imposed conditions as to the 
ownership, manning, and even construction of a ship within that State. Prior 
to its amendment in 1988, the 1894 UK Merchant Shipping Act defined a 
British ship purely by its owQHUVKLSRI%ULWLVKVXEMHFWVRU³ERGLHVFRUSRUDWH
HVWDEOLVKHGXQGHU DQG VXEMHFW WR WKH ODZVRI+HU0DMHVW\¶VGRPLQLRQV´ 
subsequently being redefined simply as a question of registration.7  Until 
1919, the right to allow ships to fly their maritime flags was a privilege 
granted only to maritime States (i.e. those that were not completely land-
locked); only after the First General Conference of Communication and 
Transit held in Barcelona in 1921 was this right extended to all States, with 
or without sea coasts.8 7RGD\DYHVVHO¶VQDWLRQDOLW\ LVJHQHUDOO\ WDNHQ WR
relate to its inclusion in the register of a particular State, R v. Bolden and 
Dean (1997)9 providing case law. 
 
Open Registers 
 
Up until the period immediately following World War II, the majority 
RI WKHZRUOG¶VPHUFKDQWIOHHWZDVUHJLVWHUHGZLWK6WDWHVRSHUDWLQJFORVHG
registers; thereafter, there began a rapidly growing transfer of ships to the 
newly established open registers. The history of the growth of the 
Panamanian and Liberian registers is adequately documented over a range 
of sources, and only the briefest of outlines will be given here. Panama first 
established its open register in 1916 and increasingly became the target for 
American shipowners, who were subject to the restrictive regime ± 
particularly with regard to manning - imposed at home by the USA maritime 
OHJLVODWLRQ DQG ZKR FRXOG EHQHILW IURP WKH QHZ UHJLVWHU¶V PRUH UHOD[HG
manning and taxation regime. Panama was subsequently joined by 
Honduras. During the war, the transfer of shipVIURPWKH$OOLHV¶UHJLVWHUVWR
                                                          
7
 Ready N.P., 1998. Ship registration. 3rd. ed. London, LLP Reference Publishing 
8
 Middleton J., 2007.  Op.cit.  The rights of a land-locked state to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas was 
reaffirmed in Article 4.1 of the 1968 United Nations Convention on conditions for registration of ships ± see 
below. 
9
 R v. Bolden and Dean (The Battlestar) (1997) 2 Int. M.L.  Plymouth Crown Court held that the yacht Battlestar, 
although owned by US citizens, with a certificate of American ownership and entitled to fly the American flag, 
was not, in fact, deemed to be registered in any country since its owners had not entered the vessel into the US 
public registration records. 
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Panama permitted war materials to be shipped under the flag of a non-
belligerent. After the war, an upturn in trade and the entry of a large number 
of surplus war-time ships into the market both contributed to a growth in the 
number and sizes of open registers. The Liberian register was established in 
1949, posing a challenge to the Panamanian register at a time when the latter 
was experiencing a temporary downturn in attractiveness to foreign 
(particularly American) shipowners. In the 1950s, open registers accounted 
IRUVRPHRIWKHZRUOG¶VIOHHWDQGE\WKHPLG-1980s, more than 30%.  At 
the beginning of 2009, over 73% of the total merchant fleet were registered 
under foreign flags (mainly in open registers), with Panama accounting for 
RIWKHZRUOG¶VWRQQDJH10 
The primary function of a number of open registers is primarily to 
develop an income stream for the State; a secondary function may be to 
develop related maritime economic activities.11 Whilst requirements for 
registration differ between States, there are features that tend to be common 
amongst many of the open registers, including low taxation regimes, 
minimal ownership requirements, reduced manning requirements, an 
inadequate or absent maritime administration, and a general absence of 
regulatory observance ± a State may be signatory to a range of international 
agreements, but that in itself does not necessarily equate to their strict 
observance and regulation. Whilst national registers tend to treat shipping 
companies in a manner similar to other types of organisations, some open 
registers may have specific and more favourable regimes for shipowners. 
Notwithstanding this more laissez-faire approach, some open registers may 
operate a system that is as professional as some of their closed register 
counterparts, if not more so. A number of major oil companies have 
registered their tanker fleets with open registers and maintained and 
operated those vessels to the highest of standards.12 In order to be successful, 
open registers, as with others, have to be acceptable worldwide and to 
distinguish themselves from registers considered to be of lesser standing; 
and some open registers have established networks of worldwide ship 
inspections for vessels that may rarely visit their home ports. However, the 
less reputable of open registers may continue to be attractive to those 
operators who intend to restrict their operations to selected and less 
                                                          
10
 Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics, 2009. Shipping statistics and market review. 53 (7) 2009. 
11
 Hosanee N.M., 2009. Op.cit. 
12
 Farthing B., M. Brownrigg 1997. Op.cit. 
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regulated areas. Nevertheless, open registers in general have been associated 
with thHSHMRUDWLYHWDJRI³)ODJVRI&RQYHQLHQFH´)2&DQGWKLVFRQWLQXHV
to be the case from bodies or organisations that see open registers as a 
threat,13 such as the OECD and the European Union, which use the term 
freely in their documentation.  
In a number of instances, the open register nations do not actually 
operate their registers as a national body, but are content to hand over the 
control of their maritime flag to a third party in exchange for a fixed sum ± 
hence the Mongolian and Cambodian registers are operated from Singapore 
whilst International Ship and Aircraft Registries offers the services of the 
registers of Belize, Cambodia, Dominica, Vanuatu, and Georgia from 
Cyprus, as well as the Cyprian register itself.14  ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6KLS¶V5HJLVWHU
offers DQ HYHQZLGHU UDQJHRI ZKDW LW ODEHOV ³6KLSV 5HJLVWU\ LQ)ODJV RI
&RQYHQLHQFH´IURPLWVEDVHLQWKH&DQDU\,VODQGV15  
Since its inception as recently as 1994, the Cambodian ship registry 
has had a chequered history. Operated initially by the Cambodian Shipping 
Corporation (CSC) based in Singapore, it grew rapidly, but soon became 
synonymous with ships of poor condition and ships engaged in their 
involvement in illegal activities such as oil and cigarette smuggling, drugs 
and human trafficking, and arms running, the latter being particularly 
associated with ships from North Korea.16 Adverse world opinion finally 
forced the Cambodian authorities to withdraw control of the register from 
CSC in 2002, passing it first to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport 
before allocating it six months later to the new International Ship Registry 
of Cambodia, based in South Korea. The Ministry describes the Cambodian 
ship registry as a Flag of Convenience in its website.17  
The term Flag of Convenience is particularly associated with the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDQVSRUW:RUNHUV¶)HGHUDWLRQ,7)ZKLFKVLQFHKDV
been waging a campaign against these registers. The ITF defines FOCs as 
³:KHUH EHQHILFLDO RZQHUVKLS DQG FRQWURO RI D YHVVHO LV IRXQG WR OLH
                                                          
13
 In an interHVWLQJWZLVW5HDG\XVHVWKHWHUP2SHQ5HJLVWHUDV³DHXSKHPLVPIRU)ODJRI&RQYHQLHQFH´Op.cit..   
14
 It is somewhat noteworthy that the website address for this organisation is www.flagsofconvenience.com.  
15
 Flags listed include Barbados, Belize, Canary Islands, Comoros Islands, Dominica, Honduras, Liberia, Marshall 
Islands, Panama, St.Vincent and Grenadines,  Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. See 
www.internationalshipsregister.org/2html.  
16
 Neff R., 2007.  Flags that hide the dirty truth. Asia Times 20.4.2007. 
17
 Ref: www.ciwn.mpwt.gov.kh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=72  accessed: 18.4.2011. 
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elsewhere than in the country of the flag the vessel is flying, the vessel is 
FRQVLGHUHGWREHVDLOLQJXQGHUDIODJRIFRQYHQLHQFH´ The ITF maintains a 
list of countries it considers to be FOCs ± currently numbering some 3218- 
as well as a list of blacklisted companies closely associated with FOCs. The 
inclusion of states on this list is based upon the criteria as defined by the 
Rochdale Commission of 1970,19 - WKH³5RFKGDOH&ULWHULD´± whereby states 
allow easy access to their registers, permit ownership, control and manning 
of ships by non-citizens, impose low or nil taxes on revenues earned by the 
ships, and has no maritime administration with the power to impose national 
or international regulations on the ships so registered.20 In an attempt to 
return ships  to their own national flags (and hence back to national manning 
requirements), the ITF Congress in 1958 began a worldwide boycott of ships 
under open registry, using as a basis the ITF Collective Agreement on 
minimum wages, working hours, holidays, and special conditions. The 
campaign has had two objectives ± the protection of seafarers on FOC ships 
from exploitation and the promotion of international governmental 
agreement on the need for a genuine link between the flag a ship flies and 
the nationality or residence of its owners, managers and seafarers ± thereby 
aiming to eliminate FOCs entirely.21  The campaign has forced a number of 
owners to sign collective agreements, but in over 50 years, the net effect has 
been unsuccessful in driving ships back to their national flags, many ships 
still being owned by multinational organisations, operating with multi-
national crews and registered, managed, and mortgaged in a variety of 
countries; an ITF agreement (in some instances) merely allowing owners to 
carry on without union action.22 However, despite the liberal approach 
displayed by various open registers, there is a move amongst various Flag 
                                                          
18
 The ITF lists the following as FOCs: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda (UK), 
Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Comoros, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, French International Ship 
Register (FIS), German International Ship register (GIS), Georgia, Gibraltar (UK), Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands (USA), Mauritius, Mongolia, Netherlands Antilles, North Korea, Panama, Sao 
Tome and Principe, St. Vincent, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Vanuatu. Of these, 14 are targeted on one or more of the 
blacklists compiled by the Paris and Tokyo MoUs and the US Coast Guard ± ref: MARISEC 2009, Shipping 
Industry Performance Table 2009. 
191970 Committee of Enquiry into Shipping ± Report. Cmnd.4337. London, HMSO. 
20
 Farthing B., M.Brownrigg, 1997. Op.cit.  
21
 ITF, 2010. Flags of convenience campaign. At: www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/sub-page.cfm  accessed: 
12.4.2011. 
22
 ė]oD\LU=2)ODJVRIFRQYHQLHQFHDQGWKHQHHGIRULQWHUQDWLRQDOFR-operation. International Maritime 
Law, 7 (4) May 2000, pp 111-117. 
December 2013 issue (MJLS vol. 14, nos. 1 & 2 (2013)) 
 
 
6 
 
States to distance themselves from the label of Flags of Convenience by 
limiting the age of ships that they will accept into their registers; Liberia and 
Vanuatu have an age limit of 20 years, Cyprus uses 17 years and the 
Bahamas 12 years, although older ships may be accepted after special 
inspection.23 In the case of bareboat charters, whereby the company hiring 
a ship has both technical and commercial management responsibilities for 
the ship, a vessel registered in one state is permitted to fly the flag of another 
State for the period of the charter. During this period, the operator can 
choose which register offers the greatest trading advantages, and the vessel 
is regulated by the charter registry; however, matters of title and ownership 
remain under the regulation of the underlying registry.24  
 
*HQXLQH/LQNY6RYHUHLJQ¶V5LJKW 
 
A specific and contentious feature of open registers relates to the 
H[LVWHQFHRID³JHQXLQHOLQN´EHWZHHQWKH)ODJ6WDWHDQGWKHVKLS8QGHU
domestic law, a direct link is the product of ownership, crew etc, whilst 
under international law, the link relates to the effective control over the 
administrative, technical and social matters that the State enacts over the 
vessel,25 as defined under the HSC 1958 UNCLOS 1982,26 but since no 
sanctions for the absence of a genuine link have been defined, the matter 
remains one for the individual State to interpret. The question of the need 
for a genuine link suffered a further setback in 1960 when the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) gave an advisory opinion on the constitution of the 
Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organisation (subsequently the International Maritime 
Organisation),27 ZKLFKDFFRUGLQJWRWKH2UJDQLVDWLRQ¶VFRQYHQWLRQZDVWR
consist of 14 Members from the Member governments having an important 
                                                          
23
 Ready N.P. 1998. Op.cit.. 
24
 Frendo M., 2000. The future of open registers in the European Union/OR\G¶V0DULWLme and Commercial Law 
Quarterly 2000 (3) pp.383-393. 
25
 European Parliament,  1996. The common maritime policy, Chapter 2 The sea and navigation. Directorate-
General for Research. Working Document Transport Series W14. 
26
 Geneva Convention of the High Seas 1958, Article 5(1), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 
Article 5. 
27
 Advisory Opinion of 8th June 1960 on the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the 
Intergovernmental Consultative Organisation, International Court of Justice (ICJ Reports 1960). 
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interest in maritime safety, of which not less than eight shall be the largest 
shipowning nations. The question to be determined was which States were 
WREHLQFOXGHGXQGHUWKHWHUP³ODUJHVWVKLSRZQLQJQDWLRQV´DQGLWZDVWKH
opinion of the Court that this was to be based purely in terms of  tonnage 
registered, an opinion that was distinctly unappealing to the European 
shipowners.28 Consequently, Panama and Liberia took their place on the 
Committee and as a result, international open registry flags were legitimised 
in international law.29  
Even the pronouncement of the ICJ did not precisely define the term 
µJHQXLQH OLQN¶ DQG LWZDVQRWXQWLO WKHDGYHQWRI WKH81&RQYHQWLRQRQ
Registration30 that the question was more fully addressed, with the 
Convention requiring an economic link between the Flag State and those 
that own, manage and man a vessel;31 this Convention, however, is not yet 
in force. Other case law has yielded differing interpretations, particularly in 
the case of fishing vessels being selectively registered to take advantage of 
fishing restrictions or quotas. In the Factorama case32 in which Spanish 
fishing companies set up companies in the UK in order to operate fishing 
boats under the UK flag and thereby fish under the UK fishing quota, in 
effect giving Spanish fishing boats a larger quota than they would otherwise 
enjoy,33 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) took the view that registration 
alone was sufficient to establish nationality and a genuine link.34 The Court 
took  a similar viewpoint in subsequent cases, including Commission v. 
Ireland 35where Ireland was trying to prohibit Spanish-owned British 
fishing vessels from operating in it waters, and in Commission v. Hellenic 
                                                          
28
 As a result of the advisory opinion, of the eight originally nominated Member states of  USA, UK, Norway, 
Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, France and Germany, the latter two were replaced by Panama and Liberia. 
29
 Stopford M., 1997. Maritime economics. 2nd ed. London, Rowtledge. 
30
 United Nations Convention on the Conditions for Registration of Ships 1986, Articles 7 to 10. 
31
 Middleton J., 2007.  Op.cit. 
32
 Case C- 221/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factorama, [1991] ECR I-3905. 
33
 $SUDFWLFHNQRZQDV³TXRWDKRSSLQJ´ 
34
 Churchill R.R., C. Hedley, 20007KHPHDQLQJRIWKH³JHQXLQHOLQN´UHTXLUHPHQWLQUHODWLRQWRWKHQDWLRQDOLW\
of ships$VWXG\SUHSDUHGIRUWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDQVSRUW:RUNHUV¶)HGHUDWLRQ8QLYHUVLW\RI:DOHs, Cardiff. 
35
 Case C-280/89, Commission v. Ireland [1992] ECR I-6185.  
December 2013 issue (MJLS vol. 14, nos. 1 & 2 (2013)) 
 
 
8 
 
Republic36LQ ZKLFK WKH $GYRFDWH *HQHUDO 6WDWHG WKDW ³Article 5 of the 
Geneva Convention cannot be interpreted as a rule requiring a genuine link 
between a State and a ship to be in a particular form as a necessary 
precondition for the grant of nationality.´ ,Q WKH Anklgemyndigheden v. 
Poulsen and Diva Navigation37 case of a vessel beneficially owned and 
crewed by Danish nationals, but registered in Panama, and trying to land 
fish allegedly caught in contravention of European regulation, the ECJ 
determined that, ³8QGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDYHVVHOLQSULQFLSOHKDVRQO\RQH
QDWLRQDOLW\WKDWRIWKH6WDWHLQZKLFKLWLVUHJLVWHUHG´ 
The right of a sovereign (State) to determine who may fly its flag was 
pronounced by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Muscat Dhows 
case 1905,38 which concerned the right of France to grant its flag to dhows 
owned by subjects of the Sultan of Muscat. Frendo39 RSLQHVWKDW³it is the 
novelty of the decision in the Muscat Dhows case that sets the scene for 
UHJLVWUDWLRQ¶VWDNLQJDMXGLFLDOOLIHLQGHSHQGHQWRIRZQHUVKLS´ a verdict that 
was more recently reiterated by the US Supreme Court  in Lauritzen v. 
Larsen 1953.40 Consequently, the loose interpretation of a genuine link is 
deemed to have contributed significantly to the growth of open registers.41 
 
Second Registers 
 
Before examining further the roles and attractions of open registers to 
shipowners, a short consideration of second or international registers and 
provisions for bareboat charters is appropriate. Positioned somewhere 
between closed and open registers, second or international registers have 
                                                          
36
 Case C-62/96, Commission v. Hellenic Republic [1997] ECR I-6725. 
37
 Case 286/90, Anklgemyndigheden v. Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019. 
38
 Muscat Dhows case 1905Hague Court Reports 1916. p63. The case concerned the right by France to grant the 
right to fly the French flag to dhows which were allegedly engaged in slave trading, this right only being valid 
prior to the signing of a treaty in 1892. Ref: Ready N.P. 1998. Op.cit. 
39
 Frendo M., 2000. The future of open registers in the European Union/OR\G¶V0DULWLPHDQG&RPPHUFLDO/DZ
Quarterly 2000 (3) pp.383-393. 
40
 Lauritzen v. Larsen 1953 345 U.S.571 (1953), whereby a Danish seaman serving as part of a crew of a ship of 
Danish registry and owned by a Danish national sought damages in a New York district Court under the Jones 
Act for injury sustained whilst the ship was in Havana. It was held that the law of the flag governed all matters of 
discipline on board the ship. 
41
 OECD, 2003. Ownership and control of ships. Maritime Transport Committee, Directorate for Science, 
Technology and industry. March 2003. Paris, OECD. 
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usually been established as a response by certain of the more traditional 
flags to reverse the exodus of ships to open registers and away from their 
own national registers. Such registers have enabled states to maintain some 
control over their fleets, with effective maritime administrations able to 
secure adherence to appropriate regulations and standards, whilst allowing 
them to operate in a lower cost environment, at the same time safeguarding 
also some of their nationally-based businesses, skills and employment. 42 
The first of these registers to be established was the Norwegian 
International Ship Register (NIS, 1987), under whose flag ships were able 
to sail with third world crews. Norway was followed by others, including 
France (Kerguelen Islands); Denmark (DIS); Germany (GIS); Portugal 
(Madeira); the Marshall Islands; and the Isle of Man (UK).43 The opening 
RI6LQJDSRUH¶VVHFRQGUHJLVWHUZDVXQOLNHWKHRWKHUVDQDWWHPSWWRPRYH
away from the stigma of what previously had been regarded as just another 
open register.44  The effect of the rise of these second registers is seen to 
somewhat blur the distinction between open and closed registers.45 
 
Promoting Anonymity 
 
Whilst hiding the identity of ownership may be undertaken for valid 
(and quite legal) commercial reasons, it also facilitates those owners who 
do not wish to advertise their ownership of ships poorly maintained or crews 
poorly supported, or who have a history of ship detentions, as well as those 
with distinctly illegal or even terrorist intent. Although certain open 
registers seek openly to display their rebuttal of internationally accepted 
standards and legal instruments, it is not simply the operation of the registers 
themselves that can prove attractive to the more nefarious (as well as many 
upright) shipowners in masking the identity of beneficial ownership; it is 
also the manner in which they accommodate the various financial 
mechanisms that allow corporate identities to be obscured in a web of 
                                                          
42
  6WHYHQVRQ'%6HDIDUHUV¶ULJKWVHG)LW]SDWULFN'0$QGHUVRQ2[IRUG2[IRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV  
43
 Others include China (Hong Kong, Macao); Netherlands (Antilles); New Zealand (Cook Islands). Ibid. 
44
 Tenold S., 2000. A most convenient flag ± the development of the Singapore ship register, 1969-82. SNF Report 
69/00 SIOS ± Centre for International Economics and Shipping, Foundation for Research in Economics and 
Business Administration, Bergen. December 2000. 
45
 Alderton T., N. Winchester, 2002.  Regulation, representation and the flag market.  Journal for Maritime 
Research, September 2002. London, National Maritime Museum. 
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nominees and holding companies which might be spread across a range of 
jurisdictions. The OECD report of 200346 on ownership and control of ships 
concluded that it is ³YHU\ HDV\ DQG FRPSDUDWLYHO\ FKHDS WR HVWDEOLVK D
complex web of corporate entities to provide very effective cover to the 
LGHQWLWLHVRIEHQHILFLDORZQHUVZKRGRQRWZDQWWREHNQRZQ´ Whilst some 
registers try to establish the true ownership of a vessel, others promote 
anonymity as a major advantage.47  Such registers may be deemed worthy 
of the title of Flag of Convenience.  
7KHSULQFLSDOZD\LQZKLFKDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VRZQHUVKLSPD\EHKLGGHQ
is through the use of bearer shares. Unlike normal registered shares, bearer 
shares do not carry the name of the owner and may be transferred from 
person to person without many changing hands or details of the transfer 
being registered. They thus facilitate a high level of anonymity, especially 
when issued to private limited companies, and their use is positively 
promoted by certain open registers.48 When private companies, which are 
based upon ordinary (as distinct from bearer) shares, are initially registered, 
some details of shareholders are required. At this juncture, beneficial owners 
can hide their identity through the use of Nominee Shareholders who act on 
behalf of beneficial owners. Since corporate bodies require at least one 
Director nominally responsible for the operation of the company, the use of 
Nominee Directors acting as legal intermediaries can also hide the identity 
of beneficial owners since some jurisdictions cannot (or do not wish to) 
compel nominees to reveal the identity of true beneficial owners. Allowing 
corporations to act as Nominee Directors adds a further level of 
obfuscation.49 In many instances, the use of trustees, trust companies, 
lawyers and company formation agents offers further anonymity for those 
wishing to establish private companies, especially in offshore locations, 
where their active role may be limited to the provision of a local address, 
providing nominee shareholders and directors, and acting as local agents, 
but all with limited or no real operational function,50 lawyers and notaries in 
particular claiming professional confidentiality. 
                                                          
46
 OECD, 2003. Op.cit. 
47
 Alderton T., N. Winchester, 2002. Op.cit. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 OECD, 2003. Op.cit. 
50
 Ibid. 
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In terms of corporate structure, anonymity is furthered by the use of 
private limited companies, International Business Corporations (IBCs), 
Trusts, and less frequently, Foundations and Partnerships. Private limited 
companies may easily be converted to shell companies, which have no 
assets or activities, but whose role is solely to hold legal standing as a 
corporate body. Such organisations are usually available easily and cheaply 
off-the-shelf, as are IBCs, which exist to facilitate international exchanges, 
but are barred from doing business in the country of incorporation, and 
therefore rarely pay taxes or are required to produce annual reports.51 The 
use of one-ship companies without other traceable assets protects any other 
assets of the beneficial owner from claims against a specific ship. Holding 
companies may be formed to hold the shares of the single-ship company, 
whilst the operation of the ships is undertaken by one or more management 
companies, shares in these operations being in the form of bearer shares held 
by the beneficial owner.52 By establishing a complex corporate web of 
organisations and nominees across a range of jurisdictions whose main 
interest may be merely the collection of registration fees whilst offering a 
high level of anonymity, the identity of beneficial owners can be hidden to 
the extent that might defy all but the most detailed and determined of 
investigations. Given that the USA is probably the State most focussed on 
the security of shipping arriving at its ports, there is a certain irony in the 
fact that the open register, which facilitates anonymity, was a creature of 
their creation. 
As well as promoting their own ship registration services, many States 
also offer offshore company registration in parallel. Not untypical are the 
advantages offered by the Seychelles, which in addition to allowing up to 
100% foreign ownership for ship registration, also offers incorporation of 
IBCs, with a high level of anonymity and privacy; no taxes of any sort, no 
ties to the EU; no accounting or reporting requirements; and no public 
register of company officers.53 The tiny island of Kiribati in the Gilbert 
Islands (area 811sq. m. and a population of a little over 100,000) offers 
similar inducements, including no restriction on ownership of ships; not 
being mandatory to incorporate a company in Kiribati or to register through 
lawyers; trading profits and capital gains are not taxed; and there is no 
                                                          
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Stopford M., 1997. Maritime economics. 2nd ed. London, Routledge. 
53
 Ref: www.sfm-offshore.com  accessed: 18.4.2011 
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UHVWULFWLRQRQWKHQDWLRQDOLW\RIDVKLS¶VRZQHUVRUFUHZ54 At the same time, 
many of the traditional jurisdictions will allow local subsidiaries of foreign 
corporations to register their vessels under their flags, thereby allowing 
ownership to be concealed. By registering with overseas dependencies 
which operate their own registers but also hold close links with the 
traditional home jurisdictions, owners may also enjoy the benefits of naval 
protection and diplomatic representation that the home state provides. In 
such instances, recognised international representation or support, coupled 
with hidden ownership, may prove to be a dual advantage. A strong 
association with a traditional flag may also serve to deflect monitoring and 
port State inspection of vessels which might otherwise be among the more 
targeted groups.  
The quest for anonymity often comes to the fore when ships are finally 
sent for disposal. Often when a ship is purchased for scrapping, usually by 
cash buyers, she will undergo a change of name and registry under her new 
owners. There are instances, however, when this change of identity happens 
whilst the vessel is actually at sea and en route to the breakers. In 2007, the 
former ferry Beni Ansa sailed from Almeira to Alang for scrapping.  The 
vessel had been detained under advice from the European Commission, and 
a detailed inspection indicated the presence of hazardous materials on board. 
During that month, the ship changed its name and registration with different 
open registers, from Beni Ansar under the Moroccan flag, to Beni under the 
flag of Tuvalu, and then to Aqaba Express under the flag of the Comoros 
Islands.55 After finally being allowed by the authorities to sail, ostensibly to 
Romania, for the purposes of refurbishment,56 the ship then changed course, 
arriving to anchor off Alang under yet another name, the Al Arabia. Whilst 
it is conceivable for a ship to be re-registered in order to enjoy economic 
advantages, it is difficult to associate such a series of changes being 
undertaken for any purpose other than a simple hiding of identity (and hence 
of liability) once it had ended its operational life and was actually at sea and 
destined for the shipbreakers.  
                                                          
54
 Ref: www.kiribaship.com  accessed: 18.4.2011. 
55
  Since its completion in 1975, the ship had had several names prior to Beni Ansar, including Wisteria and 
Princess Maria Emerald. 
56
  A repeat of the intended plan for the Sandrien ± see above. 
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Using statistics of the top 25 Flags States as a proportion of the 
ZRUOG¶VWRQQDJHLQDUHSRUW57 compiled for the European Commission 
showed that 42.8% of the operational tonnage traded under the four States 
of Panama (22.1%), Liberia (10.0%), the Bahamas (5.6%) and Marshall 
Island (5.1%). At the point of scrapping, however, whilst 28.2% of the ships 
arriving at the breakers were under the Panamanian flag and 13.6% under 
the Liberian flag, the remainder of the top 25 listing included states that did 
not appear in the operational list, and included Tuvalu (5.8%), St.Kitts-
Nevis (4.2%), Mongolia (2.5%), the Comoros Islands (0.9%), Cambodia 
(0.9%) and Dominica (0.6%). The inclusion of Panama and Liberia as 
OHDGLQJ³VFUDSSLQJ6WDWHV´FRXOGEHDQVZHUHGE\WKHVL]HRIWKHODUJHIOHHWV
that they operate commercially; the inclusion of the other named States 
appears more of a function of the low fees, low crewing standards, high 
anonymity and short-term registration that these States offer as FOCs. 
 
Sub-standard Shipping 
 
One of the consequences of the way in which beneficial ownership 
and liability are so easily obscured and limited, particularly through single 
ship companies, lies in facilitating (if not directly encouraging) the 
prevalence of sub-standard shipping. Sub-standard shipping is manifest not 
only in minimal levels of ship maintenance, but also in low consideration 
for crews, both in terms of numbers and of basic provisions and in regard to 
internationally defined standards, as well as poor shore-based management 
HWF:ULWLQJ LQė]oD\LU58 stated that we KDG³DJOREDOLVHGVKLSSLQJ
sector...based on private enterprise (where) there are not many who are 
really dedicated to the safety of the ship, crew or the protection of the marine 
HQYLURQPHQW´ 
A report commissioned by the OECD59 recognised the growing 
concern over the relationship between shipping casualties and sub-standard 
shipping in the 1970s. When trading conditions were poor, expenditure on 
ship maintenance was an easy target for owners, yet when conditions were 
good keeping a ship in full employment also tended to relegate upkeep to a 
low level of priority. Despite the introduction of various international 
                                                          
57
 COWI, 2009. Support to the assessment of a new legislative proposal on ship dismantling. Final report, 
December 2009 for the European Commission DG Environment. 
 
58
 ,Q=2ė]oD\LUZDVDParitime law consultant and member of the IMO Roster of Experts and 
Consultants. Op.cit.  
59
 SSY Consultancy and Research, 2001. The cost to users of substandard shipping. Prepared for the OECD 
Maritime transport Committee. 
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treaties relating to the safety of ship operations, their uptake and 
HQIRUFHPHQWKDVQRWDOZD\VEHHQWRWKHIRUHIURQWRIVRPHVWDWHV¶SULRULWLHV60 
The turn of the century witnessed a series of maritime accidents that 
demonstrated numerous parallels. In February 2001, the 27-year-old tanker 
Kristal broke in two and sank off the Spanish Atlantic coast in heavy 
weather. In 1999, the 24-year-old tanker Erika also broke in two and sank 
off the Spanish coast in heavy weather. Both of the ageing ships were 
registered in Malta and were in need of repairs to replace sections of 
corroded steelwork. Both ships had been classed by the Registro Italiano 
Navale (RINA). Following the loss of the KristalDPHHWLQJRIWKH,02¶V
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) called for a review of 
Resolution A.744(18) on guidelines on the enhanced programme of 
inspections during surveys of bulk carriers and oil tankers in order to 
strengthen the effectiveness of the Enhanced Survey Programme 
requirements, with reference to surveys and repairs.61 
It was, however, the breakup of the Erika and the oil pollution that 
resulted,62 reinforced by the similar loss of the Prestige some three years 
later, that triggered a number of legislative measures63 from the EU aimed 
at removing such ships from European waters, but put the required action 
mainly in the hands of shipowners, Flag States, and classification societies. 
This left other bodies such as charterers, cargo owners and brokers free to 
pursue whatever cheap rates they could find from these old, sub-standard 
vessels which, in the case of tankers, often work at the dirty end of the 
product market. Even so, many parties were able to cover their risks by 
insurance unless wilful negligence or recklessness could be proven, owners 
also being protected from the penalties of extensive pollution occurrences 
                                                          
60
 Ibid. 
61
  IMO, 2001. Report to the Maritime Safety Committee. Sub-Committee on ship design and equipment, 44th 
session. DE44/19, 26 March 2001 
62
 The .ULVWDO¶V cargo of molasses was dispersed at sea. In his description of the loss of the Kristal, Langewiesche 
GHVFULEHVWKHFDUJRDV³DORZvalue cargo carried on the cheap by ships that are typically one step removed from 
WKHJUDYH´Ref: Langewiesche, 2004. The outlaw sea. New York, North Point Press. 
63
 The Erika I measures were completed just three months after the loss of the vessel and included substantial 
amendments to the Port State Directive to increase the extent of port state inspections within the EU; measures to 
ban the employment of single-hulled tankers within EU waters; and a tightening of the Classification Society 
Directive, including suspending recognition of classification societies deemed to pay insufficient attention to 
enforcing ship safety standards. The Erika II package established an improved system of Community monitoring, 
control and info system for maritime traffic, a fund for the compensation of oil pollution damage in European 
waters and the formation of a European Maritime Safety Agency. 
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by the provisions of the Civil Liability Convention.64 Ownership of the Erika 
was with a single-ship company registered in Malta, the beneficial 
ownership of which proved difficult to trace until the individual in question 
came forward to identify himself. The resultant court case in the Paris 
Tribunal65 in 2008, arising from the loss of the Erika, overturned the status 
quo to the extent that parties which hitherto had enjoyed a general avoidance 
of penalties were now also deemed to be at fault; the charterer - Total SA - 
being included with the owner, managers and classification society RINA66 
as guilty parties. The group was collectively fined the sum of ¼PZLWK
7RWDO 6$ UHFHLYLQJ DQ DGGLWLRQDO ¼ ILQH IRU IDLOLQJ WR WDNH LQWR
account the state and the age of the ship before chartering it.67 Total SA also 
VHWXSDQ$WODQWLF&RDVW7DVN)RUFHZLWKDEXGJHWRI¼PWRFOHDQXSWKH
polluted beaches. Malta, as Flag State, escaped penalties. By comparison, 
the fines imposed on the owner, and the classification society, were 
relatively limited. 
The OECD 2003 report contained a case study based on the 
consequences of the Erika oil spill and its impact on tanker and sale and 
purchase markets and commented on the wide differential in charter rates 
between modern ships (i.e. ships less than 15 years old), and older tonnage, 
that had resulted from the accident. Yet this widening of rates for vessels of 
differing quality may actually serve to promote the continued use of certain 
sub-standard ships precisely because of the attractiveness of their low rates 
                                                          
64
 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage.   Ref: SSY Consultancy and 
Research, 2001. Op.cit. 
65
 A subsequent review by the French &RXUWG¶$SSHO LQXSKHOGWKHHDUOLHUMXGJHPHQWZKLFKµEUHDNVQHZ
JURXQG¶LQWKDWLWZDVRQHRIWKHIHZFDVHVZKHUHWKHVLQNLQJRIDYHVVHOZDVWULHGXQGHUFULPLQDOODZDQGWKDWWKH
classification society was among the accused. The Court also concluded that while the owner may benefit from 
civil compensation under the Civil Liability Convention, it is not protected for its role under criminal law. Further, 
the operator is not covered by the terms of the CLC, neither is the classification society, which had an equally 
independent role. The owner, who had been made aware of the need for repairs to the heavy corrosion on the ship 
by class,  had obtained an Oil Pollution Compensation Fund certificate to be able to lease the vessel for further 
commercial operations. RINA, who expressed doubts about the state of the vessel, nevertheless allowed it to sail; 
RINA was deemed to have issued certificates of compliance without prior inspection on a number of occasions. 
Ref: Mink E., 2010. Erika process; French Appeal Court pronounced judgement. Mainbrace July 2010, No. 3 at: 
www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contenID=37&itemID=2271 accessed: 3.10.2010.  
66
 The role and liability of the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) as classification society for the Prestige is 
VWLOO XQGHU OHJDO SURFHVV 6SDLQ FODLPLQJ WKDW $%6 KDG EHHQ ³QHJOLJHQW UHFNOHVV ZLOIXO DQG ZDQWRQ´ LQ LWV
inspection of a sub-standard ship. Ref: Wene J., 2005. European and international initiatives due to the Erika and 
Prestige incidents. Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand Journal 2005 (19). 
67
 Hollinger P., 2008. France fines Total £143m over coastal damage from oil spill. Financial Times, 17.01.2008 
p7. 
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WRFHUWDLQVKLSSHUV7KHUHSRUWFLWHVWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VYLHZWKDW
³the fact that ships of appalling condition continue to be employed for 
transportation of oil shows that charterers do not have sufficient 
disincentives to give up their intolerable practice of deliberately selecting 
ORZTXDOLW\WRQQDJH´68 
Meanwhile, ships that have reached the ends of their lives and are fit 
only for disposal can also present major problems when their owners seek 
to distance themselves from the liabilities of the hazardous materials 
contained within the structure of ships. The Sandrien was an early instance 
of a vessel being denied permission to sail directly from the port of 
Amsterdam to the breakers because of the hazards deemed to be contained 
within the structure of the ship. Previously operating as the Maria S under 
the Mexican flag and the ownership of the (ULND¶V owner, the ship had spent 
a year under detention at the Italian port of Augusta.69 Now as the Sandrien 
and under a new owner and the Bolivian flag, she required extensive pre-
cleaning prior to scrapping, yet the owner proved difficult to trace, having 
set up offices in a number of different countries and communicating only 
through lawyers.70 In 2002, the Court of First Instance in the Council of 
State, The Hague, ruled that an end-of-life vessel not properly emptied of 
hazardous material should be regarded as hazardous waste.71 This was the 
first legal recognition that a ship containing asbestos should be treated as 
hazardous waste,72 but since proving ownership was impeded, the vessel 
ZDVXOWLPDWHO\VFUDSSHGLQGU\GRFNLQ$PVWHUGDPWKH¼PLOOLRQFRVW
being borne by the Netherlands Government and the city of Amsterdam.  
During the 18 months that the ship was impounded, some 20 Indian crew 
                                                          
68
 SSY Consultancy and Research, 2001. Op.cit.  
69
  5HI%DVHO$FWLRQ1HWZRUN*UHHQSHDFH³PRVWZDQWHG´VKLSUHPDLQVDWKRUQLQSRUW¶VVLGH/RQGRQ
/OR\G¶V/LVW  11 February 2002. 
70
  Greenpeace, 2002. Shipbreaking. News. Malpractice at ship-for-scrap Sandrien ± crew and environment victim 
of ship dealers. At: www.greenpeaceweb.org/shipbreak/news14.asp.  accessed: 1.10.2010.  The owner was 
subsequently defined as Upperton, a Mauritius-based company who operating behind a post office box number in 
Mauritius. Ref: Vlierodam Wire Ropes Ltd., 2004. Dutch carry chem. Tanker scrap costs.  Daily shipping 
newsletter 2004 ± 237 At: www.biblio.org/maritime/Pdf/scheepvaartnieuws/2004/novem/237-16-11-2004.PDF  
accessed:1.10.2010. 
71
  Council of State, The Hague, Upperton Ltd. v the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. 
LJN number AE4310 Case number 200105168/2. 
72
  Greenpeace, 2003.  Comments on the report of the correspondence group: selected cases of decommissioning 
of vessels indicating the need for mandatory requirements. Submitted by Greenpeace International.  IMO Marine 
Environmental Protection Committee, 49th session. Agenda item 3. MEPC49/3-2 9 May 2003. London, IMO. 
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members remained on board, without pay and unable to return home.73 At 
WKH HQG RI  WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 7UDQVSRUW :RUNHUV¶ Federation (ITF) 
arranged for the safe repatriation of the crew, but the owners merely 
replaced them with a new crew, even though the ship was unable to sail in 
its current condition.  
The OECD report74 on the cost of sub-standard shipping contains a 
detailed listing of the potential costs that may accrue to all involved with the 
employment of such ships. Amongst those costs are the costs to seafarers 
(and passengers), who may suffer loss of life or injury, inadequate 
remuneration or even non-payment, inadequate accommodation, off-duty 
time and, increasingly, the possibility of criminal prosecution. Shipowners 
may face the physical loss of their vessel ± insurance may be deemed invalid 
if negligence can be proven ± higher insurance premiums, compensation 
claims for pollution, and losses through detentions, among other outcomes. 
Other owners of more compliant and better maintained vessels may 
collectively suffer a general lowering of charter rates through the operation 
of sub-standard ships as well as a general rise in insurance costs and port 
inspections. Managers, operators, classification societies, charterers, 
shippers and cargo owners may all be increasingly accountable for the 
consequences of sub-standard shipping, as the cases of the Erika and the 
Prestige have demonstrated, and suffer losses through loss of cargoes, late 
deliveries resulting from port inspections and detentions, higher insurance 
costs, etc. The marine environment may also bear the cost of pollution 
resulting from accidents to shipping. 
One of the consequences of inadequate Flag State control over the 
vessels over which they have jurisdiction has been the development of Port 
State control,75 ZKHUHE\3RUW6WDWHVFDUU\RXWLQVSHFWLRQVDJDLQVWWKHVKLSV¶
various certificates and the relevant FODJ6WDWH¶VRZQQDWLRQDOUHTXLUHPHQWV
thereby imposing standards upon ships which do not observe them 
                                                          
73
  (YHQWKRXJKWKHFUHZUHFHLYHGQRSD\LWZDVUHSRUWHGWKDWWKHFUHZKDGWKHPVHOYHVSDLGWKHVKLS¶VGHDOHUVIRU
the maritime education that they were to receive while on board against the promise from the owners ± a group of 
ship dealers ± of  work and a future despite the fact that the ship was unseaworthy. Ref: Greenpeace 2002. Op.cit. 
74
 SSY Consultancy and Research, 2001. The cost to users of substandard shipping. Prepared for the OECD 
Maritime transport Committee. 
75
 The establishment of Port State Control actually originates with the provisions of the 1929 Convention on the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), reaffirmed in subsequent revisions 1960 and 1974 and in the provisions of the 
International convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the ILO Minimum Standards 
Convention . Ref: Farthing B., M.Brownrigg, 1997. Op.cit.  
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voluntarily.76 This acceptance of Port State Control has been portrayed as 
the acceptance by a Flag State of the direct intervention by another 
sovereign state into the matter of a ship being an extension of its home 
territory.77 The growth of Port State Control has led to the formation of 
several groupings of Port States into regional operational agreements ± 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)78 - to co-ordinate the inspection of 
vessels being identified as high risk in terms of their seaworthiness. As a 
natural development of association between States, similar coordination 
between different MOUs has started to develop and as a result of the shared 
results of monitoring and special inspection programmes, the potential 
operating areas for sub-standard shipping has started to shrink. As part of 
the European response to the loss of the Erika, the process of targeting sub-
standard ships by a points system, but not necessarily requiring the ships to 
be inspected under the Port State Control system, was changed to one 
whereby such highlighted ships have to undergo mandatory detailed 
inspections; ships repeatedly failing such inspections ultimately being 
blacklisted from entering European ports.79  However, the role of Port States 
and MOUs remains but a substitute for effective control by owners and Flag 
States.  The OECD 2001 report sums up the regime with the comment that 
a combination of an accommodating Flag State and a lax classification 
society offers ample scope for the owners of sub-standard ships to 
contravene international conventions.80 
 
Attempts at Revision 
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 ė]oD\LU=2)ODJVRIFRQYHQLHQFHDQGWKHQHHGIRULQWHUQDWLRQDOFR-operation. International Maritime 
Law, 7 (4) May 2000, pp 111-117 
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 Ref: Farthing B., M.Brownrigg, 1997. Op.cit. 
78
 The first of these arrangements, the Paris MOU, was formed in 1982 by the maritime authorities of 17 
European States, Canada and the Russian Federation.  Subsequently, some 8 other similar organisations have 
been established along similar lines to cover the Black Sea, Caribbean, Gulf Region, Latin America, West and 
Central Africa, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and Asia-Pacific regions. 
79
 Directive 2001/106/EC of the European Parliament and Council amending Council Directive 95/21/EC. 
  Ref: Wene J., 2005. Op.cit. 
80
 See footnote 71. 
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7KH2(&'¶VILQDOUHSRUWRQWUDQVSDUHQF\RIRZQHUVKLS81 considered 
that improvements to transparency could result from a combination of 
changes to the corporate mechanisms that are directed at promoting 
anonymity, and the transparency of the shipping registers themselves. 
However it acknowledges that it is this very anonymity that is the attraction 
to users and the revenue they generate for the providers of the registers in 
question. A range of specific suggestions for improvements is offered, but 
the report recognises the many vested interests that are present and suggests 
that a way forward may be to promote confidentiality, as distinct from 
anonymity, which may be more acceptable to all parties than unilateral 
action by individual administrations. However, in the absence of any 
autogenesis of improvements from the administrations themselves, attempts 
have been made to regulate against some of the less reputable of the 
registries, both directly and indirectly.  
In a move against open registers, a United Nations Convention for 
Registration of Ships was adopted in 1986,82 intending to bring order to the 
question of registrations - and ultimately to phase them out - by highlighting 
the need for efficient and competent maritime administrations through a 
genuine link between owners and Flag States.83 This was the product of two 
studies undertaken by UNCTAD and authoriVHGLQRQµUHSHUFXVVLRQV
RISKDVLQJRXWRSHQUHJLVWHUIOHHWV¶DQGRQµOHJDOPHFKDQLVPVIRUUHJXODWLQJ
WKHRSHUDWLRQVRIRSHQUHJLVWU\IOHHWV¶84 The Convention requires that a Flag 
State shall have an effective maritime administration with appropriate 
arrangements for registration and enforcement, fix the conditions for 
granting nationality and ensure that the ships flying its flag complies with 
UHOHYDQWLQWHUQDWLRQDOVWDQGDUGVRIPDQQLQJVDIHW\³SROOXWLRQ FRQWURO´HWF
In addition, it seeks to ensure that those responsible for the management and 
operation of its ships are readily identifiable and accountable. The question 
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 OECD 2004,  Maritime security ± options to improve transparency in the ownership and control of ships. Final 
report . June 2004. Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry. 
82
 Geneva, 7 February 1986. 
83
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of ownership proved to be a contentious issue, centred on the provisions 
deemed necessary for a Flag State to exercise adequate control and 
jurisdiction, whilst the subject of manning nationality was a polarising issue 
between the national and open register States.85 The Convention also 
requires Flag States to ensure that the accountability of owners or their 
representatives be established in the State, and that they have legal and 
financial accountability. The Convention is still not in force, with only 24 
RIWKHQHFHVVDU\6WDWHVFRQWUROOLQJRIWKHZRUOG¶VVKLSSLQJKDYLQJ
ratified or acceded to it. 
A proposal was made in 1989,86 and subsequently amended in 1991,87 
by the European Commission for the adoption of a Community fleet and a 
Community shipping register ± EUROS - in an attempt to halt the move of 
ships from the registers of Member States to the open registers of non-
Member States, and the spread of secondary national registers, which the 
Commission regarded as a distortion of competition.88 Inducements 
included lighter and more flexible manning requirements, fewer Port State 
Control inspections in European ports, State aid and possible financial 
support for the training of seafarers.89 The register was to work in parallel, 
rather than instead of, the national registers, and on a voluntary basis, a ship 
flying the Community flag alongside its own national flag to indicate its 
inclusion in both registers,90 but the idea was rejected by the Council of the 
European Communities.91 The proposal was therefore replaced by 
³Regulation 613/91 on the transfer of ships from one register to another 
within the Community,´ which was aimed at facilitating completion of the 
internal market and providing for the mutual recognition of certificates 
issued in accordance with international rules such as SOLAS and 
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MARPOL.92 The EU has sought to improve the overall state of shipping by 
stepping up the pressure for Port State Control inspections at its ports and 
by pressure on the open registers operated by States such as Cyprus and 
Malta, which were wishing to join the Union. The formation of the Paris 
MOU on Port State Control was an early manifestation of this process.93 
 
Conclusion 
 
The international shipping industry fully operates as a global industry, 
ZKRVHIRUWXQHVKDYHDWWLPHVZD[HGDQGZDQHGGUDPDWLFDOO\³7UDGLWLRQDO´
registers, if in fact many of them can still lay claim to such a title, since they 
now themselves operate secondary or international registers with more 
relaxed regimes, have fought hard against the spread of open registers - and 
appear to have lost. Open registers now account for more than half of the 
ZRUOG¶V PHUFKDQW IOHHW DQG DOWhough many open registers may operate a 
maritime administration that is able to register and regulate their vessels as 
well as (and in some instances, possibly better than) some closed registers, 
it is the more relaxed regulatory regime in relation to ownership, manning 
and taxation etc., requirements that have proved irresistible to shipowners, 
whilst any desire or even ability on the part of some Flag States to recognise 
and effectively regulate international standards being in direct opposition to 
their very UDLVRQG¶rWUH. Further, the well±publicised advantages of financial 
mechanisms designed specifically to hide the identity, and hence the 
liabilities, of ownership through offshore corporations, nominees, bearer 
bonds, shell companies, and the like, have doubtless encouraged many 
owners, especially those owners of single-ship companies, in the practice of 
minimal consideration both for the state of ships and regard for the crew and 
hence the prevalence of sub-standard shipping. In periods of a low trade 
cycle, expenditure on maintenance and the like is easily ignored; in times of 
a high trade cycle, it may also prove secondary (or very secondary) to the 
opportunity for profitable trading; either way, many ships are run on a 
totally profit maximisation/upkeep minimisation basis. Attempts at formal 
revision to the existing systems via UN Convention or EU Directives on 
registration have proved to be still-born and it has taken serious instances of 
ship losses - as demonstrated by the sinkings of the Erika and Prestige - to 
forward the improvement of sub-standard shipping.  
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Postscript 
 
In 2009, the Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and 
Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships was adopted - although it has yet 
to come into force. The Convention is founded upon a comprehensive 
system of documentation, surveys and inspections, approvals and 
certification for a ship destined for demolition. Given that a number of open 
registers are unlikely to have the maritime administration necessary to 
support such requirements, it will be interesting to observe how many such 
registers become party to the Convention, how many will be able, or even 
wish, to observe the requirements of this regime, and how their current 
clientele will regard such registers once the Convention enters into force. 
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